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Abstract:	The	 2017	 Jakarta	 Gubernatorial	 Election	was	 one	 of	 the	most	 competitive	 local	
elections	 in	Indonesia.	This	election	clearly	used	religious	and	ethnic	populism	strategy	that	
divided	 Jakarta	 citizens	 into	 two	 groups:	 A	 Muslim	 Governor’s	 supporters	 Vs.	 Incumbent`s	
supporters.	The	 root	of	 the	Muslim	governor’s	 supporters	was	 the	 rejection	of	 some	 Islamic	
organizations	 against	 the	 rise	 of	 Chinese-Christian	 Incumbent	 Governor	 –	 Basuki	 Tjahaja	
Purnama	or	“Ahok”.	This	sentiment	found	a	momentum	when	Ahok	was	accused	of	blasphemy	
against	Islam	that	provoked	Muslims	furious.	Moreover,	Anies	Baswedan	became	a	successful	
candidate	 utilizing	 the	 sentiments	 and	 used	 mosques	 to	 echo	 the	 resistance	 against	 non-
muslim	Governor	candidate.		
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Introduction			"In	the	past,	we	pribumi	(a	term	that	could	 be	 loosely	 defined	 as	 “native	Indonesians”)	 were	 oppressed	 and	defeated;	 now	 we	 are	 independent,	 now	is	the	time	for	us	to	be	masters	in	our	own	country.”	 (Anies	 Baswedan,	 Governor	 of	Jakarta	Inauguration`s	Speech,	16	October	2017).	The	 victory	 speech	 of	 the	 2017	elected	 Jakarta	 Governor,	 Anies	Baswedan,	 seemed	 to	be	 the	 culmination	of	 all	 political	 fights	 in	 one	 of	 the	 most	brutal	 local	 election	 involving	 religious	and	 ethnic	 sentiments.	 Despite	 being	elected,	 Baswedan	 maintained	 his	position	 as	 a	 Governor	 supported	 by	“native”	 and	 Islamic	 circles,	 instead	 of	above	 all	 diverse	 groups	 in	 Jakarta.	 A	banner	 stated	 "Awakening	 of	 the	 Native-
Muslims"	 (Kebangkitan	 Pribumi	 Muslim)	was	 installed	 not	 far	 from	 the	 location.	The	 day	 the	 narrative	 was	 clearly	 built,	the	 victories	 of	 Anies	 Baswedan	 and	
Sandiaga	 Uno	 were	 the	 victories	 of	 the	Native	Muslims	against	others.	It	 also	 confirmed	 the	 strategy	 of	Baswedan	 during	 the	 Jakarta	 Governor	Election	 campaign.	 In	 a	 video	 circulating	at	 an	 internal	 meeting	 of	 Baswedan	supporters,	 Fatah	 as	 his	 Political	Consultant	 explained	 how	 the	 sermon	 in	the	 mosque	 as	 the	 FIS	 in	 Algeria	effectively	 won	 the	 election.	 He	personally	wanted	this	strategy	to	be	run	in	Jakarta.	(Johan	SP,	2017)		So	as	 in	 command,	Friday	prayers	in	 Jakarta	 and	 surrounding	 areas	 were	filled	 with	 Friday	 praying’s	 sermons	spreading	 hatred	 against	 the	 incumbent,	Basuki	 Tjahaya	 Purnama	 (Ahok)	 who	 is	Christian	 and	 Chinese.	 Ahok	 became	muslim`s	 enemy	 after	 his	 speech	 in	thousand	 islands	 considered	 as	blasphemy	 by	 Majelis	 Ulama	 Indonesia	and	 made	 public	 anger.	 And	 impact	 the	anger	of	Muslims	in	Indonesia.	
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This	 strategy	 was	 a	 populist	strategy,	 in	 which	 a	 candidate	 built	 a	position	 in	 front	 of	 a	 ranks	 of	homogeneous	 society	 by	 building	antagonistic	 relationships	 with	 other.	 As	Jakarta	 is	 the	 central	 of	 Indonesian	politics	 and	 became	 Jakarta	 Governor	 is	the	next	step	 to	be	 leader	 in	 the	national	level,	 it	 is	 very	 important	 to	 understand	what	 happened	 in	 the	 2017	 Jakarta	election.	This	paper	explained	 the	proses	of	 how	 the	 populism	 was	 built	 in	 the	Jakarta	 2017	 Gubernatorial	 election	 and	its	impact	to	Democracy	in	Indonesia.		Mude	and	Kalwatser	(2012,	pp.	3–7)	 stated	 three	 main	 approaches	 to	populism.	 The	 first	 is	 populism	 as	 a	particular	 type	 of	 political	movement.	 In	this	perspective,	populism	 is	a	multiclass	movement	 organized	 around	 a	charismatic	 leader	 (Germani,	 1978).	 The	main	 ingredient	 is	 not	 only	 the	 presence	of	 a	 strong	 leader	but	 also	 the	 formation	of	 a	 movement	 that	 appeals	 to	heterogonous	 social	 groups.	 This	approach	 is	mainly	used	 to	 explain	Latin	American	populism	and	fascism	in	Europe	when	 regarding	 the	 emergence	 of	extremist	mass	movement.		The	 second	 approach	 is	 populism	as	 a	 political	 style,	 characterized	 by	 the	promotion	 of	 a	 particular	 kind	 of	 link	between	political	leaders	and	electorate,	a	link	 structured	 around	 a	 loose	 and	opportunistic	 appeal	 to	 “the	 people”	 to	win	and/or	exercise	political	power.	The	third	approach	is	–	as	used	in	this	 paper:	 populism	 as	 a	 discourse.	Concerning	 this	 perspective,	 Laclau	(2005,	 p.	 18)	 explains	 that	 populism	 is	characterized	by	 confronting	 the	existing	hegemony	 by	 means	 of	 a	 discursive	construction	capable	of	dividing	the	social	into	 two	 categories:	 “the	 power	 bloc”	versus	“the	people.”		Following	 this	 category,	 Panizza	 (2005,	pp.	 3–4),	 defined	 populism	 as	 “an	 anti	status-quo	 discourse	 that	 simplifies	 the	political	 space	 by	 symbolically	 dividing	
society	 between	 ‘the	 people’	 (as	 the	underdogs)	and	 its	 ‘other’.”	Furthermore,	he	 argued	 that	 the	 identification	 of	 “the	people”	 and	 “the	 other”	 are	 political	constructs,	 symbolically	 established	through	 the	 relation	 of	 antagonism,	 a	mode	 of	 identification	 in	 which	 the	relation	between	 its	 form	and	 its	content	is	given	by	the	process	of	naming—that	is,	of	 establishing	 who	 the	 enemies	 of	 the	people,	 and	 therefore	 the	 people	 itself,	are.		 Study	 by	 Spruyt,	 Keppens	 and	Droogenbroeck	 (2016)	 show	 that	populism	is	embedded	in	a	feeling	of	deep	dissatisfaction,	 not	 only	with	 politics	 but	also	 with	 people's	 lives	 in	 general.	 In	addition,	we	 show	 that	populism	 is	most	strongly	 supported	 by	 stigmatization	groups	 who	 face	 difficulties	 in	 finding	 a	positive	social	identity.		As	 Indonesia	 has	 been	 a	democratic	state	since	1998,	populism	 in	this	 paper	 refers	 to	 Canovan’s	 (1999)	explanation	 of	 a	 populist	 movement	within	 a	 mature,	 well-established	democratic	 system.	 She	 argued	 that	 in	modern	democratic	societies,	populism	is	best	 seen	 as	 an	 appeal	 to	 the	 people	against	 both	 the	 established	 structure	 of	power	and	the	dominant	ideas	and	values	of	 the	 society.	 Populists	 claim	 legitimacy	on	 the	 grounds	 that	 they	 speak	 for	 the	people,	 to	 represent	 the	 democratic	sovereign,	 not	 a	 sectional	 interest	 of	 a	specific	 economic	 class.	 Populist	 values	also	 vary	 according	 to	 the	 context,	depending	 upon	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 elite	and	 the	 dominant	 political	 discourse	(Canovan,	1999,	P.	3).	Based	 on	 the	 current	 Europe’s	experience,	 there	 are	 several	 main	features	 of	 populism	 (Fuest,	 2017).	First,	 populists	 usually	 describe	 society	as	 divided	 into	 two	 homogeneous	 and	antagonistic	 groups:	 people	 are	 often	juxtaposed	 with	 ruling	 elites	 who	 are	seen	 as	 corrupt.	 The	 second	 is	
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overemphasizing	 the	 negative	 effects	 of	globalization.	 Populists	 reject	immigration	and	oppose	the	 integration	of	politics	and	 international	 institutions	that	 support	 and	 regulate	 economic	exchanges	 between	 countries.	 Third,	populists	 support	 expansive	 fiscal	policies	and	tend	to	override	disturbing	government	budget	constraints.	Referring	 to	 Mudde	 (2017)	 there	are	 three	key	 core	 concepts	 of	 populism.	First,	the	“people”.	People	in	the	populist`	perception	 is	 usualy	 related	 to	 the	 self-perception	 (or	 self-idealization)	 of	 the	targeted	people	as	the	construction	of	the	populist.	 Second,	 general	 wills.	 They	closely	 linked	 to	 homogenous	interpretation	 of	 people	 who	 have	 same	interests	 and	 preferences.	 Basic	 of	 the	general	 wills	 is	 common	 sense	 and	anyone	 who	 opposes	 it,	 is	 devious	 and	part	of	the	corrupt	elite.	Third,	the	elite.	It	is	distinghuished	based	on	morality:	good	people	Vs.	evil	elite.		Populist	 can	 deploy	 a	 mixture	 of	national,	 ethnic,	 class,	 regional,	 and	religious	identities	in	order	to	define	who	belongs	within	 the	 category	of	 ‘us’	 and	 –by	extension	–	who	is	consigned	to	‘them’.	In	 several	 western	 countries,	 right	 wing	politicians	 use	 Christianity	 as	 religious	identity	 that	 used	 to	 confront	 Islam	 as	threat	of	the	people	wellbeing.		Several	 cases	 of	 religious	 based	populism	 collected	 in	 the	 provocative	book	 title:	 Saving	 the	 People,	 How	populist	 Hijack	 Religion.	 Since	 9/11,	Muslim	wanted	 to	 impose	 their	 religious	values	 and	 traditions	 on	 the	 people	 as	part	of	a	surreptitious	`Islamization`	plan.	Ideas	 of	 invasion,	 infiltration,	 contagion,	conspiracy,	 replacement	 and	 impending	irreversible	 crisis	 represent	 key	components	 of	 the	 populist	 imaginary,	and	all	of	 those	are	present	 in	the	notion	that	a	deliberate	process	of	islamisation	is	occurring	 under	 our	 noses	 in	 many	Western	 democracies.	 (Marzouki,		mcDonell,	2016:	5).		
Populism	 also	 cannot	 be	 released	from	 the	 media	 for	 the	 spread	 of	 the	populits	 idea.	 Nowadays,	 internet	 -especially	 social	media	 became	 the	most	important	 media,	 compare	 to	 the	conventional	one.		Research	 by	 Engesser,	 Ernst,	 Esser,	and	 Buchel	 (2015)	 found	 that	 populism	manifests	 itself	 in	 a	 fragmented	 form	 on	social	 media.	 Populist	 statements	 can	 be	found	 in	 various	 countries,	 parties,	 and	levels	 of	 politician	 status.	 While	 a	 large	number	 of	 politicians	 advocated	 for	 the	people,	 attacks	on	 the	 economic	 elite	were	favored	by	populist	left-wingers.	Attacks	on	the	media	 elite	 and	 exclusion	 from	 others,	however,	were	mostly	carried	out	by	right-wing	 politicians.	 This	 shows	 that	 social	media	gives	populist	actors	 the	 freedom	to	articulate	 their	 ideology	 and	 spread	 their	messages.		Study	by	Salgado	(2018)	in	Portugal,	found	 that	 the	 populist	 issues	 such	 as	corruption	 and	 immigration	 spread	 by	social	media.	The	mainstream	media	play	a	role	 as	 “establish”	 media	 that	 counter	 the	issue.	 Gerbaude	 (2018)	 stated	 that	 the	compatibility	 between	 social	 media	 and	populist	 politics	 stems	 from	 the	 way	 the	ability	of	mass	media	social	networks,	when	'mass	networks'	involving	billions	of	people	around	the	world,	provide	channels	that	are	appropriate	for	mass	politics	and	appeal	to	people	 typical	of	populism.	Social	media	 in	populist	 movements	 play	 a	 role	 as	 a	people's	 voice	 channel	 and	 popular	 rally,	providing,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 a	 means	 for	dissatisfied	 individuals	 to	 express	themselves,	 and	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 with	spaces	 where	 dissatisfied	 Internet	 users	can	 gather	 and	 formed	 a	 partisan	 online	crowd.		
Methods	This	research	 is	used	a	qualitative	method.	Qualitative	method	 is	defined	as	an	 inquiry	 process	 of	 understanding	
I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	
Journal	of	Governance	Volume	4,	Issue	1,	June		2019	
	 	 						 4	
based	 on	 distinct	 methodological	traditions	of	 inquiry	 that	explore	a	social	or	 human	 problem	 (Creswell,	 1998,	 p.	15).	 The	 researcher	 builds	 a	 complex,	holistic	 picture,	 analyses	 words,	 reports	detailed	 views	 of	 informants	 and	conducts	the	study	in	a	natural	setting.		This	 qualitative	 research	 is	classified	 as	 a	 case	 study:	 an	 exploration	of	a	“bounded	system”	or	a	case	over	time	via	 detailed,	 in-depth	 data	 collection	involving	multiple	sources	of	information	that	 is	rich	 in	context.	(Creswell,	1998,	p.	61).	Several	 interviews,	observations	and	document	 analysis	 conducted	 to	 collect	the	 data.	 To	 analyse	 the	 data,	 this	research	 used	 the	 four	 forms	 of	 data	analysis	 and	 interpretation	 used	 in	 the	case	study	by	Stake	(as	cited	 in	Creswell,	1998,	pp.	153–154):			
Result	and	Discussion	Previously,	 Jakarta	 politics	received	 less	 attention	 among	 scholars.	Massaki	 and	 Honna	 (2014)	 provide	several	 reasons.	 First,	 it	 was	 understood	that	local	politics	independent	of	national	politics	 did	 not	 exist	 in	 Jakarta.	 The	boundary	 between	 national	 and	 Jakarta	politics	 is	 blurred	 and	 both	 are	considered	closely	related.	Second,	 Jakarta	 politics	 is	 very	different	 from	 the	 politics	 in	 other	 parts	of	 Indonesia.	 As	 the	 nation's	 capital,	Jakarta	 is	 too	 metropolitan	 and	 has	 the	highest	 percentage	 of	 the	 upper	 middle	class	 in	 the	 country.	 Political	 behavior	and	the	pattern	of	selecting	these	groups	are	 very	 decisive	 in	 Jakarta	 and	 not	 the	same	as	those	in	other	parts	of	Indonesia.	Third,	Jakarta's	politics	are	openly	visible	to	everyone.	Every	day,	all	major	national	media	 outlets	 research	 and	 cover	 the	activities	 of	 the	 governor,	 deputy	governor	 and	 provincial	 parliament	 of	Jakarta.	However,	 after	 the	 2012	 election	when	 Joko	 Widodo	 won	 the	 election	against	 Incumbent	 Fauzi	Bowo,	 and	 then	
He	was	elected	President,	 Jakarta	Politics	became	 one	 of	 the	 most	 important	political	 events.In	 2012,	 Joko	 Widodo	(Jokowi)	 and	 Basuki	 Tjahaja	 Purnama	(Ahok)	 ran	 to	 be	 Jakarta	 Governor	 and	Vice	 Governor,	 supported	 by	 PDIP	 and	Gerindra	 Parties.	 Both	 of	 them	 were	political	 outsiders	 in	 Jakarta,	 yet	 famous	as	 success	 leaders	 in	 their	 hometowns:	Jokowi	in	Surakarta	and	Ahok	in	Belitung	Timur.	They	capitalized	on	the	frustration	of	 Jakartans,	 while	 offered	 hopes	 for	 a	new	 identity	 and	 possible	 solutions:	 the	New	 Jakarta	 (Jakarta	 Baru).	 For	 many	Jakartans,	 The	 New	 Jakarta	 was	 the	answer	 to	 their	 frustrations	 on	 Former	Governor	Fauzi	Bowo	and	formal	political	institutions.	 They	 created	 oppositional	relationship	 between	 the	 “New	 Jakarta”	as	 symbol	of	his	 struggle	 in	election,	and	the	 established	 “Old	 Jakarta”	 that	 was	represented	 by	 Foke	 as	 the	 incumbent	(Hamid,	2012).		But	 Jokowi	 governed	 Jakarta	 on	short	period,	less	than	two	years.	In	2014,	he	 ran	 for	Presidential	 election	and	won.	Politics	 in	 Jakarta	 has	 become	 more	interesting.	It	meant	that	the	Governor	of	Jakarta	 position	 was	 a	 strategic	 political	stepping-stone	 to	 be	 a	 national	 figure.	Then	on	November	19th,	2014,	Ahok	was	inaugurated	 as	 the	 Governor	 of	 Jakarta.	The	mandate	 to	 realize	New	 Jakarta	was	now	under	 the	 leadership	of	Ahok.	 From	the	beginning,	 the	 rise	of	Ahok	as	a	non-muslim	 Governor	 cause	 more	 rejection,	especially	from	some	Islamic	groups.	One	of	 the	 biggest	 groups	 was	 Save	 Jakarta	Movement	 (Gerakan	 Menyelamatkan	
Jakarta	 –	 GMJ)	 that	 claimed	 supports	 by	99	elements.	The	most	important	element	of	 GMJ	 was	 Islamic	 Defenders	 Front	(Front	Pembela	Islam	–	FP).	The	tagline	of	GMJ	 was	 Rejecting	 Jakarta	 from	 a	 Non-Moslim	 Governor	 (“kafir”).	 They	 also	questioned	 several	 Ahok's	 policy:	prohibition	 of	 slaughtering	 sacrifice	animals	 (Qurban)	 in	 public	 space,	allowing	 alcohol	 drinks	 in	 hotel	 and	
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supermarket	 and	 also	 Ahok's	 idea	 about	localization	 of	 prostitution.	 (Republika,	01	 June	 2015)	 GMJ	 conduct	 a	 rally	 in	 1	 December	2014	with	the	tittle	:	Rally	of		1	milion	 people	 get	 rid	 of	 Ahok	 and	 to	disseminate	 this	 invitation	 .
	
	
	
Figure	1:	Rally	of	1	million	people	to	get	rid	of	Ahok			In	 another	 rally,	 on	 December	 1st	2014,	the	GMJ	enthroned	a	Jakarta	muslim	figure	 and	 member	 of	 FPI,	 Fahrurozzi	Ishaq,	 as	 the	 Jakarta's	 muslim	 Governor.	Then	 GMJ	 continuously	 campaigned	 for	muslim	 candidate	 to	 be	 Governor	 in	 the	next	 election.	 They	made	 online	 campaign	to	 support	 their	 idea	 through	gubernurmuslim.com.		
	
The	Battle			 Religious	and	 identity	became	main	issue,	 altogether	 with	 poverty	 issue	 also	during	the	Governor	Election.	GMJ,	besides	making	 anti	 Ahok	 campaign,	 also	 actively	campaigned	 and	 even	 initiated	 a	 selection	of	 Muslim	 Governor	 Candidates.	 Muslim-native	identity	was	confronted	with	Ahok's	Christian	identity.	GMJ	with	Islamic	Community	Forum	(Forum	 Umat	 Islam,	 FUI)	 and	 Islamic	Defenders	 Front	 (FPI)	 create	 the	 High	Council	of	Jakarta	for	Syariah	(Islamic	Law)	to	the	Muslim	Governor	of	Jakarta	(Majelis	Tinggi	 Jakarta	Bersyariah	Untuk	Gubernur	
Jakarta	 MTJB-GMJ),	 led	 by	 Habib	 Riziek	Syihab.		MTJB-GMJ	 held	 convention	 of	 the	Governor	 of	 Jakarta	 in	 order	 to	 realize	Jakarta	 with	 Syariah	 Implementation.	Beside	 MTJB-GMJ,	 there	 was	 also	 the	Jakarta	Servant	Assembly	 (Majelis	Pelayan	Jakarta,	 MPJ),	 a	 collection	 of	 Islamic	scholars	 who	 also	 aims	 to	 nominate	candidates	 for	 governors,	 led	 by	 Didin	Hafidhudhin,	 former	 President	 of	 Justice	Party.		However,	 the	process	by	MTJB-GMJ	and	 MPJ	 failed	 in	 bringing	 up	 candidates	for	 Governor	 who	 can	 compete	 officially.	All	 the	 official	 candidates	 who	 officialy	registered	 through	 the	 Election	Commission	came	through	political	parties.	MTJB-GMJ	 only	 succeed	 to	 propose	Sandiaga	Uno	to	be	one	of	 the	alternatives	of	Governor	or	Vice	Governor.	Finally,	 there	 were	 three	 pair	 of	candidates	 in	 the	 2017	 Jakarta	 Governor	election:	 Agus	 Harimurti	 Yudhoyono	(Agus)	 -	 Sylviana	 Murni	 (Sylvi),	 Basuki	Tjahaja	 Purnama	 (Ahok)	 -	 Djarot	 Saiful	
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Hayat	 (Djarot),	 and	 Anies	 Baswedan	(Anies)	 -	 Sandiaga	 Uno	 (Sandi)	 who	 will	fight	in	the	election.	Agus-Sylvi	 pair	 was	 nominated	 by	four	political	parties:	the	Democratic	Party,	United	 Development	 Party,	 National	Awakening	 Party	 and	 National	 Mandate	Party.	 Agus	 was	 the	 eldest	 son	 of	 the	 6th	President	 of	 Indonesia,	 Susilo	 Bambang	Yudhoyono.	 He	 resigned	 as	 a	 military	middle	 officer	 to	 become	 a	 governor	candidate.	Sylvi	was	a	senior	bureaucrat	in	Jakarta	 Local	 Government.	 Sylvi's	 position	opened	 opportunities	 for	 bureaucrat	supports.		Ahok-Djarot	 was	 nominated	 by	Indonesian	 Democratic	 Struggle	 Party,	Golkar	 Party,	 Hanura	 Party,	 and	 National	Democrat	 Party.	 Ahok	 was	 an	 incumbent,	replacing	 Joko	 Widodo	 as	 the	 previous	Governor.	He	previously	was	a	member	of	National	Parliament	from	Golkar	Party	and	Regent	 of	 Belitong	 Timor.	 Djarot	 was	 the	Vice	 Governor	 of	 Jakarta,	 replacing	 Ahok.	Previously	 he	 was	 Mayor	 of	 Blitar,	 East	Java,	for	two	periods.		The	 third	 candidate	 pair	was	 Anies	Baswedan	 (Anies)	 -	 Sandiaga	 Uno	 (Sandi)	
supported	 by	 Gerindra	 Party	 and	Prosperous	 Justice	 Party.	 At	 that	 time,	Anies	 was	 a	 former	minister	 of	 education	and	 culture	 had	 just	 been	 removed	 from	Jokowi’s	 cabinet.	 Previously	 he	 was	 a	political	 scientist	 and	was	once	 the	Rector	of	 Paramadina	 University.	 Sandy	 was	 a	young	and	wealthy	entrepreneur	in	various	fields,	especially	investment	and	energy.	Various	 Islamic	 groups	 who	 joined	in	 JB-GMJ	 and	MPJ,	 finally	 agreed	 that	 the	most	 important	 thing	 to	 do	 is	 supporting	the	 candidate	 of	 Muslim	 Governor,	 both	Agus-Sylvi	 or	 Anis-Sandy.The	 priority	was	to	 prevent	 non-moslem	Governor	winning	the	election	(VOA	Islam,	2016).	During	the	campaign,	programmatic	issues	to	solve	various	problems	in	Jakarta	did	 not	 become	 important	 discourses.	Furthermore,	 incumbent	 seemed	 to	 fail	showing	 its	 performance	 in	 fixing	 Jakarta	problems.	 Ahok’s	 success	 story	 was	covered	 by	 religious	 and	 ethnic	 issues	dominated	news	surrounding	the	election.		As	 a	 result,	 in	 the	 first	 round	followed	 by	 three	 candidate	 pairs	 of	election,	the	following	votes	were	obtained.
	
Table	1	
Result	of	First	Round	Election	15	February	2017	
No	 Candidates	and	Supporter	Party	 Voters	1	 Agus	Harimurti	Yudhoyono	–	Sylviana	Murni	(Democrat	Party,	Unity	Development	Party,	National	Awakening	Party,	dan	National	Mandat	Party)	 17.05%	
2	 Basuki	Tjahaya	Purnama	–	Djarot	Saiful	Hayat	(Indonesian	Democratic	Struggle	Party,	Golkar	Party,	Hanura	Party,	National	Democrat	Party)	 42.99%	
3	 Anies	Baswedan	–	Sandiaga	Uno	(Gerindra	Party	dan	Welfare	and	Justice	Party)	 39.95%	
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Source:	KPU	DKI	Jakarta	(Jakarta	General	Election	Commission)	(2017)	
	 As	regulated	in	Law	no.	29	of	2007	on	 the	 Provincial	 Government	 of	 the	Special	 Capital	 Region	 of	 Jakarta,	 the	winner	 of	 the	 Regional	 Head	 Election	must	 obtain	more	 than	 50%	 of	 the	 vote.	Since	 no	 one	 gets	more	 than	 50%	 votes,	
the	 second	 round	 of	 elections	 must	 be	held.	 Basuki	 -	 Djarot	 and	 Anies	 -	 Sandi	drove	into	the	second	round,	while	Agus	-	Sylvi	 was	 eliminated.The	 result	 of	 the	final	 election	 could	 be	 seen	 in	 the	 tabel	below	as	a	comparison.		
Table	2	
Result	of	Final	Round	of	the	2017	Jakarta	Gubernatorial	Election	19	April	2017	No	 Candidates	 Voters	1	 Basuki	Tjahaya	Purnama	–	Djarot	Saiful	Hayat	 42.04%	2	 Anies	Baswedan	–	Sandiaga	Uno	 57.96%		 Total	 100%	
Source:	KPU	DKI	Jakarta	(Jakarta	General	Election	Commission)	(2017)		Observing	 results	 for	 each	district,this	 is	 very	 unexpected	 Ahok	almost	 got	 no	 additional	 votes	 in	 the	second	 round.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 Anies-
Sandi	got	overwhelming	number	of	votes,	successfully	hijacked	almost	all	the	voters	Agus	–	Sylvi	in	the	first	round.	Notice	the	table	below.	
	 No	 Candidates	 Voters	for	Each	Candidate	in	Municipality/City	Level		 	 Agus-Sylvi	 Basuki-Djarot	 Anies-Sandi	1st	 2nd	 1st	 2nd	 1st	 2nd	1	 Thousand	Islands	 3891	(27.8%)	 	 5.532	(38.8%)	 5.391(38%)	 4.851	(34%)	 8.796(62%)	2	 North	Jakarta	 142.142(15.5%)	 	 416.720(48.4%)	 418.096	(47.3%)	 301.256(35.1%)	 466.743(52.7%)	3	 West	Jakarta	 203.107(16.1%)	 	 613.194(48.6%)	 611.180(47.2%)	 444.743(35.3%)	 685.079	(52.8%)	4	 Central	Jakarta	 101.744(17.8%)	 	 244.727(43.0%)	 243.574(42.3%)	 222.814	(39.2%)	 332.803	(57.7%)	5	 South	Jakarta	 177.363(14.8%)	 	 465.524(38.7%)	 459.753	(37.9%)	 557.767(46.5%)	 754.140(62.1%)	6	 East	Jakarta	 309.708(19.4%)	 	 618.880(38.8%)	 612.630(38.2%)	 665.902	(41.8%)	 992.946	(61.8%)	
Source:	KPU	DKI	Jakarta	(Jakarta	General	Election	Commission)	(2017)	
	
The	People	Vs	Other	
	 Populism	 in	 local	 politics	especially	 in	 Jakarta	 was	 not	 a	 new	phenomenon.	 In	 the	 2012	 Jakarta	Gubernatoorial	 Election,	 Jokowi	 used	
populism	 by	 establishing	 identity	 as	 a	new	 Jakarta,	 face-to-face	 with	 "Old	Jakarta".	This	pattern	 succeeded	 to	bring	Jokowi	 into	 the	 Governor	 of	 DKI	 Jakarta	(Hamid,	2014).	
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	 In	 the	 2017	 Jakarta	Gubernunatorial	 Election,	 populism	occured	 but	 with	 different	 packaging.	Religion,	 ethnicity,	 and	 poverty	 were	combined	 into	 commodities	 to	 build	 and	strengthen	 the	 identity	 those	 became	antithesis	 of	 the	 incumbent.	 Islamic	groups		-	who	feel	as	majority	community	-	 didn’t	 feel	 having	 access	 to	 power	 and	resources	 since	 2014,	 the	 showing	 their	resistence	 and	 demonstrated	 opposition	to	Ahok's	leadership.			 The	momentum	was	when	Ahok	in	his	 activities	 as	 Governor	 in	 Thousand	Islands	 Regency,	 September	 27	 2016	made	a	speech	that	contain	the	statement:		
In	your	 inner	hearts,	 ladies	and	
gentlemen,	 you	 may	 feel	 you	
cannot	 vote	 for	 me,	 because	
[you	 have	 been]	 lied	 to	 by	 the	
use	 of	 Surah	 al-Maidah,	 Verse	
51.	[…]	So,	if	you	cannot	vote	for	
me	 because	 you	 are	 afraid	 of	
being	condemned	to	hell,	you	do	
not	need	to	feel	uneasy,	because	
you	 are	 being	 fooled.	 It	 is	
alright.”	His	 statement	 uploaded	 in	Youtube	 by	 provincial	 official	 and	 the	shorter	 version,	 only	 the	 statement	above	uploaded	again	 in	Facebook	with	edited	 transcript	 by	 Buni	 Yani	 in	October	 2016.	 This	 video	 became	 viral,	broadcasted	 346,354	 times	 and	 shared	11.033	 times	 (Pamungkas	 and	Octaviany,	2017).	Majelis	 Ulama	 Indonesia	 (MUI)	responded	 and	 wrote	 reprimand	 letter	(surat	 teguran)	 to	 Ahok	 in	 October	 9th,	2016.	 In	 October	 11th,	 2016,	 MUI	 made	Religius	 Opinion	 and	 Statement	(Pendapat	dan	Sikap	Keagamaan):	
“…the	 statement	 of	 Basuki	
Tjahaja	 Purnama	 was	
categorized:	 (1)	 insulting	 the	
Koran	 and	 or	 (2)	 insulting	
Ulama	 (Islamic	 scholars),	 that	
(the	 statement)	 have	 legal	
consequences.”	
1.Anti	Ahok	Rally	The	 MUI	 statement	 was	 then	responded	 by	 various	 Islamic	 groups	 by	forming	 the	 MUI	 Fatwa	 Support	Movement	 (GNPF-MUI).	 The	 GNPF	undertook	 a	 series	 of	 actions	 to	 defend	Islam	 and	 Ulama	 and	 support	 the	enforcement	 of	 Al	 Maidah's	 letter:	rejecting	 non-moslem	 as	 leaders,	 in	 this	case	 Governor	 Ahok.	 They	 also	 urged	Ahok	 to	 be	 legally	 processed	 as	 a	blasphemy	suspect.	GNPF	MUI	was	led	by	Bachtiar	 Nasir	 as	 Chairman	 and	 Habib	Riziek	Syihab	as	Chairman	of	the	Board	of	Trustees.			At	 least	 seven	 massive	 Islamic	Defense	 Rallies	 (Aksi	 Bela	 Islam)	 were	carried	out	not	only	involving	the	Islamic	community	 in	 Jakarta,	 but	 also	 from	various	 regions	 of	 Indonesia	 (extracted	from	 various	 sources	 by	 the	 Author).	Hundred	 thousand	 people	 using	 Islamic	attribute	came	to	Jakarta	to	 join	the	rally	request	 for	 the	 Police	 to	 process	 Ahok`s	Blasphemy.	 In	 third	 and	 biggest	 rally	 on	2nd	 December	 2016	 –	 knwons	 as	 212	Action	 (Aksi	 212)	 --,	 President	 Joko	Widodo	met	 the	participants	of	 the	Rally	and	followed	Friday	prayers	led	by	Habib	Riziek	Syihab.	The	massive	and	 intensive	rally	 against	 Ahok	 build	 massive	 public	opinion	and	became	national	headline	for	long	time.		
2.Mosque	as	Basis	and	Intimidation	for	
Ahok`s	Supporters		As	 stated	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 this	paper,	 making	 the	 Mosque	 as	 the	movement	 basis	 was	 a	 special	 strategy	conveyed	by	its	political	consultant	Anies	Baswedan.	 The	 strengthening	 of	 anti-Ahok	sentiment	by	using	Al-Maidah	verse	51	 letter,	 is	 constantly	 voiced	 in	 various	activities	 in	 mosque,	 especially	 Friday	prayer,	 not	 only	 in	 Jakarta,	 but	 also	outside	 Jakarta.	 This	 reinforces	 the	antagonistic	position,	between	Muslim	Vs	Ahok	Supporters.	Muslims	means	using	Al	Maidah	verse	51	as	a	guide	to	vote,	Ahok's	
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supporters	 are	 also	 supporters	 of	 the	Blasphemy.		One	 of	 its	 effects	 was	 the	 Muslim	society’s	 refusal	 to	do	corpse	praying	 for	those	 who	 were	 supposed	 to	 support	Ahok.	 One	 example	 was	 Hindun,	 whose	corpse	was	rejected	for	worshipped	in	Al	Mu`minun	 Mosque	 Setiabudi,	 South	Jakarta.	The	people	refused	to	inscribe	his	body	 at	 the	 Mosque	 for	 knowing	 that	 in	the	 first	 round	of	elections	Hindun	voted	Ahok.	 The	 religious	 figures	 said	 that	Hindun	 was	 not	 worshipped	 in	 Al	Mu'minun	 Mosque	 because	 of	 the	 heavy	rain.	 In	 fact,	 in	 front	 of	 the	mosque	was	
attached	 a	 large	 banner	 stated	 "This	Mosque	 does	 not	 Hold	 Praying	 for	Supporters	and	Defenders	of	Blasphemy"	with	 quotation	 of	 Koran’s	 letter,	 At-Taubah:	 84	 which	 legitimize	 such	 action	(Tabloid	Bintang,	2017).	The	 same	 thing	 happened	 at	Warung	Jati,	Pancoran,	South	Jakarta.	The	corpse	 of	 a	 resident	 can	 be	 worshiped	after	 his	 family	 sign	 the	 letter	 at	 the	request	 of	 the	 RT	 Chairman	 to	 elect	 the	Muslim	 Governor.	 Otherwise,	 his	 body	was	 refused	 to	 be	 worshiped.	(liputan6.com,	2017)	
	
	
Figure	2	Banner,	Not	Praying	for	Ahok`s	Supporter	Corpse	
Source:	Detik.com	(2017)	
	 This	 kind	 of	 phenomenon	 is	 a	response	 to	 the	 widespread	 use	 of	 the	Mosque	 as	 a	 means	 of	 campaign	 of	 anti	non-moslem	 governor	 candidate	 in	 the	Mosque.	
	
Intimidation	 During	 Campaign	 and	
Voting	Period		Activities	 during	 the	 campaign	period	 –	 and	 never	 happened	 before	 –	were	 the	 abandonment	 of	 Ahok	 and	Djarot	 campaigns	 in	 several	 places	 in	Jakarta.	The	mass	using	muslim	attributes	
expelled	 Ahok	 and	 Djarot	 because	 Ahok	was	 the	 blasphemy	 perpetrator.	 As	 a	result,	Ahok	and	Djarot	failed	to	carry	out	campaigns	in	several	places,	and	the	issue	of	 blasphemy	 widened	 (www.tempo.co,	2016).Furthermore,	during	voting	period,	another	 another	 intimidation	 movement	happened.	A	movement	 called	Al-Maidah	Tour	 (Tamasya	 Al-Maidah)	 mobilized	anti-Ahok	 volunteers	 to	 monitor	 the	polling	 stations	 in	 Jakarta	 on	 the	 final-round	 vday.	 Each	 polling	 station	 was	monitored	by	around	100	people.		
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The	 volunteers	 didn’t	 only	 come	from	 Jakarta,	 but	 from	 outside	 Jakarta	such	as	Tangerang,	Surabaya	and	Ciamis.	In	 social	 media	 messages	 circulating	ahead	 of	 the	 second	 election,	 there	were	calls	 for	Muslims	to	come	to	the	TPS	and	to	 escort	 the	 enforcement	 of	 Al	 Maidah	verse	 51	 which	 prohibits	 Muslims	 to	choose	 a	 non-Muslim	 leader.	 In	 posters	circulating	online,	it	appeared	Sightseeing	Al	 maidah	 was	 driven	 by	 GEMA	 Jakarta,	GMMP	and	Exponent	212.		The	 abandonment	 of	 Ahok`s	campaigns	 and	 Al	 Maidah	 Tour	
movement	 provoked	 fears	 in	 Jakarta	society	 to	 express	 their	 political	 support	freely.	 Ahok's	 Muslim	 supporters	 were	reluctant	 to	 get	 blasphemy	 supporters	label	 once	 they	 admid	 they	 supported	Ahok.	 Morever,	 they	 faced	 consequences	not	 to	 be	 prayed	 in	mosque	 if	 they	 died.	For	 Indonesian	 Muslims	 which	 religion	was	 not	 only	 private	 matters	 but	 social	affairs,	the	intimidation	created	deep	fear,	because	 life	 as	 a	 Muslim	 would	 be	considered	 imperfect	 by	 GEMA	 Jakarta,	GMPP	 and	 Exponent	 212	 as	 an	organization	 that	 opposes	 Ahok.
	
Figure	3.Leafet	Al	Maidah	Tour
		
Populism	and	Democracy	in	Jakarta	In	 2012,	 Jokowi	 used	 populism	 to	build	 differentiation	 and	 antagonistic	relationships	 between	 New	 Jakarta	 and	Old	Jakarta	in	a	top-down	manner.	On	the	contrary,	 the	 polarization	 over	 the	 2017	Jakarta	 Elections	 was	 bottom-up	 built.	The	 Muslim	 community’s	 anger	 over	Ahok's	 statement	 made	 Muslim	 identity	stronger,	 not	 only	 in	 Jakarta	 but	 in	various	places	in	Indonesia.	As	 a	 matter	 of	 fact,	 the	 kind	 of	pattern	for	using	both	Muslim	and	native	
identities,	 was	 already	 tried	 in	 the	 2012	Jakarta	 Gubernatorial	 Election.	 Rhoma	Irama,	 who	 supported	 incumbent	 Fauzi	Bowo,	 used	 mosque	 to	 campaign	 not	 to	elect	a	non-moslem	leader,	in	which	Ahok	was	 the	 vice	 governor	 candidate	 of	Jokowi.	Fauzi	who	claimed	as	Betawinese	made	 	 an	 	 effort	 	 to	 	 establish	 	 his		religious	 image	 throughout	 his	governorship.	(Miichi,	2014)	Another	 -	 extreme	 one	 was	 when	an	 intimidation	 and	 violence	 video	broadcasted	 during	 campaign	 period	 in	
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YouTube	 threatened	 that	 if	 the	 Chinese-Indonesian	 participated	 in	 the	 election,	the	 1998	 riot	 in	 Jakarta	 would	 happen	again.		However,	 this	 effort	 was	unsuccessful	 because	 after	 all	 the	governor	candidate	was	Jokowi,	a	Muslim	and	 a	 Javanese.	 The	 situation	 changed	when	 Ahok	 replaced	 Jokowi.	 Ahok	however	 represented	 double-minority	 in	Indonesia:	a	Christian	and	a	Chinese.	Thus,	 rejection	 of	 Ahok	 on	religious	 grounds	 was	 built	 long	 before	the	 2017	 Gubernatorial	 Election.	 Then	 it	found	 the	 momentum	 of	 the	 Ahok’s	statement	in	Thousand	Islands	Regency.		The	 blasphemy	 issue	 became	 a	 major	political	one	in	the	2017	Jakarta	election,	replacing	the	programmatic	 issues.	Ahok,	a	Chinese	descent,	was	closely	associated	with	 minority	 who	 mastered	 the	economic	sector	in	Indonesia.	In	contrast,	that	 image	was	dealing	with	“native”,	 the	majority	 identical	 with	 poverty	 and	marginalization.		Religious	 identity,	 ethnicity	 and	poverty	 issues	merged	 into	 one	 identity,	native-	 Muslim	 Vs.	 Ahok.	 The	 Muslim	community	 felt	 that	supporting	a	Muslim	governor	 candidate	 and	 fighting	 Ahok	was	not	just	political	choice,	but	a	form	of	defending	 Islam.	 Therefore,	 the	 Muslim	demonstrations	 demanded	 Ahok	 to	 be	punished	in	a	case	of	blasphemy	called	as	“the	 Defending	 Islam	 Actions”.	Succesfully,	 the	actions	became	source	of	references	for	voters	in	Jakarta.		The	 strengthening	 of	 religious-based	 identities	 managed	 by	 various	Islamic	 organizations	 met	 the	 political	interests	 of	 the	 governor	 candidates.	Hence,	 it	 created	 deals	 between	 Islamic	mass	 organizations	 and	 two	 pairs	 of	Muslim	 Candidate	 Candidates:	 Anies-Sandi	 and	Agus-Sylvi.	 It	was	 reflected	on	February	11th,	 2017,	 in	which	all	muslim	governor	 candidates	 became	 part	 of	 the	action	at	Istiqlal	Mosque.	
This	 cleavage	 was	 reinforced	 by	the	massive	use	of	internet,	both	websites	and	 social	 media.	 Disbelief	 of	 some	mainstream	 media	 emerged	 news	websites	 reflected	 Muslim	 aspirations	such	 as	 VoAIslam,	 nahimunkar.com,	etc.	 	Furthermore,	 in	 some	 anti-Ahok	rallies,	 journalists	 from	 the	 media	considered	 as	 “enemy”,	 i.e.	 Metro	 TV	 or	Kompas,	 got	 various	 acts	 of	 intimidation	and	 violence.	 Meanwhile,	 the	 Defending	Islam	Actions	were	 greatly	 supported	 by	media	 owned	 by	 Ahok's	 political	opponents,	 such	 as	 TVOne	 and	 INews	(Merdeka.com,	2017).	Spreading	 the	 issue	 of	 religious	blasphemy	 was	 a	 major	 factor	 to	 make	Ahok	 as	Muslim’s	 enemy,	 spread	 quickly	through	 social	 media	 such	 as	 various	whatsapp	groups	 and	 facebook	accounts.	The	 social	 media	 action	 is	 also	 the	backbone	of	Islamic	defenders	who	could	gather	hundred	thousands	of	people	over	and	 over	 in	 the	 name	 of	 defending	religion	 (Pamungkas	 and	 Octaviani,	2017).	Populism	 is	 always	 evolving	 by	means	 of	 mass	 media.	 The	 anti-colonial	movement	 developed	 through	 print	 and	radio	technology.	Thaksin	in	Thailand	and	Koizumi	in	Japan	popularized	themselves	and	 his	 ideas	 by	 using	 television.	(Hawkins	 and	 Selway,	 2017)	 Estrada	 in	the	 Philippines	 was	 building	 image	 as	 a	defender	 of	 the	 poor	 with	 action	 films	(Mizuno	 and	 Pongpaichit,	 2009).	Currently,	information	and	ideas	promote	populism	 are	 disseminated	 using	 the	internet,	especially	social	media.	Not	 only	 religious	 issue,	 the	poverty	 one	 was	 also	 played	 by	 Anies	through	 attacking	 Ahok’s	 eviction	 policy.	In	 fact,	 some	 evictions	 Jakarta	 were	funded	by	private	sector	(developer)	such	as	Podomoro	Group.	Anies	built	alliances	by	 signing	 political	 contracts	with	Urban	Poor	Network	 (JRMK)	 Jakarta	 and	Urban	Poor	 Consortium	 (UPC).	 The	 political	contract	 contained:	 the	 change	 of	 the	
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village	spatial	plan,	the	legalization	of	the	village	 land,	 the	 affordable	 shelter	program	 for	 the	 poor,	 the	 business	licensing	 for	 street	 vendors	 and	 the	transfer	of	profession	for	pedicab	drivers.	In	 its	 release,	 it	 was	 stated	 that	 the	signing	 of	 a	 political	 contract	with	 Anies	was	a	punishment	for	Ahok	who	violated	the	political	contract	that	had	been	made	with	UPC	(UPC	and	JRMK,	2017).		The	 whole	 process	 then	 made	Anies	emerge	as	a	populist	leader,	met	his	interests	to	become	a	governor	candidate,	using	 religious	 and	 ethnic	 identities	 as	well	 as	 poverty	 one.	 After	 qualifying	 for	the	final	round	election,	Anies	became	the	only	candidate	for	Muslim	Governor,	head	to	 head	 with	 Ahok,	 the	 non-moslem	Governor	Candidate.	So	here,	the	issue	of	religion	was	 getting	 stronger.	 The	 use	 of	Friday	 prayers	 as	 mean	 of	 campaign	 to	reject	 Ahok	 was	 widespread.	 The	intimidation	 movement	 in	 the	 form	 of	banning	of	 the	corpse	praying	 for	Ahok`s	supporters	and	voters	was	more	open.	Al	Maidah	Trip	on	election	day	made	Ahok	‘s	votes	 stagnant	 at	 the	 final	 round	 of	elections.	Referring	 to	 Panizza	 (2005:	 6),	intimidation	 as	 a	 form	 of	 violence	 is	 an	extreme	 form	 of	 antagonism.	 However,	such	 violence	 is	 more	 of	 a	 mode	 of	identification,	 how	 one	 group	distinguishes	 itself	 from	 another	 (other)	group	 by	 being	 physically	 opposite.	Voters	of	Agus	and	Sylvi	in	the	first	round,	shifted	 into	 Anies	 –	 Sandy	 in	 the	 final	round.	 The	 number	 of	 Anies-Sandy's	votes	in	the	second	round	was	the	sum	of	Agus-Sylvi	and	Anies	Sandi's	votes	 in	 the	first	round.	This	 means	 that	 Muslim	 voter’s	blocks	(facing	Ahok	voters'	blocks)	in	the	first	 round	 have	 indeed	 been	 formed.	Ahok	 was	 regarded	 as	 "the	 other"	 who	must	be	defeated,	and	the	voice	of	Muslim	voters	who	 initially	 polarized,	merged	 in	the	 final	 round.	Having	Muslim	Governor	
to	 lead	 Jakarta	 was	 considered	 as	 the	general	will	of	people.		It	 was	 proved	 by	 the	 Exit	 Poll	conducted	 by	 Indicator	 Indonesia,	 that	showed	 t	 the	 main	 reason	 for	 choosing	Anies-Sandi	 was	 because	 "Religion	 same	with	Me"	equal	to	57%.	This	was	paradox	with	 satisfaction	 level	 of	 Ahok	performance	which	 is	 high	 enough	 equal	to	 71,8%	 and	 equal	 to	 58.4%	 assuming	better	 condition	 of	 Jakarta	 economy	(Indikator	Politik	Indonesia,	2017).	Yet,	 populism	 built	 by	 Anies	 by	combining	 three	 elements:	 Muslim-native-poor	identities	didn’t	end	after	the	2017	 Jakarta	 Gubernatorial	 Election	 was	over.	 Being	 a	 Governor	 of	 Jakarta	 was	now	 considered	 a	 stepping	 point	 to	become	 the	 number	 one	 figure	 in	Indonesia.	 So	 Anies's	 inauguration	 with	racist	speech	and	banners	with	the	words	"The	 awakening	 of	 Muslim-Natives"	 was	the	first	start	for	the	fulfillment	of	Anies's	next	political	ambitions.	Anies's	 speech	 that	 confirms	 his	victory	 as	 a	 Native-Muslim	 victory,	against	colonization,	is	typical	and	similar	to	the	speech	of	populist	 leaders	like	Ros	Perot	 who	 says:	 "We	 (the	 pople)	 're	 the	owners	of	 this	 country."	Or	Hugo	Chavez	(Panizza	2005)	:		
“I	declare	the	people	to	be	the	only	
and	 the	 true	 owners	 of	 the	
sovereignty.	 I	 declare	 the	
venezulean	 people	 the	 true	 owners	
of	their	own	history.	“		In	 addition	 to	 the	 religion	 used	 as	the	 basis	 for	 building	 antagonistic	relationships,	 as	well	 as	 ethnicity.	 In	 this	case,	refer	to	Mudde	(2017)	such	populist	leader	 is	 called	 nativist	 populist,	distinguish	 different	 groups	 based	 on	their	 nativism	 and	 their	 populism.	“People”	 in	 Jakarta	 context	 did	 not	 only	refer	to	muslim,	but	also	for	native	people,	and	 ethnic	 minorities	 excluded	 from	 the	people.	 In	 Jakarta	 elite	 as	 an	 enemy,	 not	only	 became	 enemy	 of	 the	 “people”	
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because	 putting	 the	 interests	 of	 ethnic	minorities,	but	representation	of	them.		As	 Mude	 and	 Kalwatser	 (2012)	convey	 in	 his	 writings,	 populism	 can	strengthen	 or	 become	 a	 threat	 to	democracy.	 In	 the	 context	 of	 Indonesia,	populism	 occurs	 during	 a	 consolidated	democratic	 situation,	 characterized	 by	elections	as	a	means	of	gaining	power,	as	
Stepan	 and	 Linz	 (1996)	 said,	 the	 only	
game	in	town.	So,	 populism	 can	 certainly	 be	regarded	 as	 influencing	 the	 quality	 of	democracy.	 Populism	 by	 using	 religion	and	 identity	 and	 using	 the	 issue	 of	poverty	 is	 a	 threat	 to	 democracy.	 From	some	 negative	 aspects	 of	 populism	 to	democracy,	what	may	 happen	was	 knowpopulism	can	use	the	notion	and	praxis	of	majority	 rule	 to	 circumvent	 and	 ignore	minority	rights.		The	 history	 of	 majority	 and	minority	 relations	 in	 Indonesia	 is	 full	 of	problems.	 Jakarta	 was	 the	 center	 of	violence	 against	 minorities	 in	 1998	during	 the	 Majority.	 Religious	 identity	politicization	 and	 ethnicity,	 can	 trigger	similar	 sentiments	 and	 events	 at	 other	times	in	other	places	and	in	the	future.	Second,	populism	can	promote	the	establishment	of	a	new	political	cleavage.	Instead	of	 positioning	 itself	 as	 a	 unifying	society	and	as	a	leader	of	all	classes,	Anies	built	 a	 bloc	 of	 its	 own	 as	 a	 pribumi-Muslim	 leader.	 Islam,	 indigenes	 and	poverty	 became	 a	 commodity	 where	Anies	 would	 stand	 there,	 building	positioning	 as	 indigenous	Muslim	 leader,	defender	 of	 the	 poor.	 Given	 the	 issue	 of	religion	in	the	Jakarta	elections,	extending	to	 the	 regions,	 this	 is	 an	 opportunity	 for	the	 use	 of	 the	 issue	 in	 the	 next	 political	momentum,	 the	 2019	 presidential	election.		
	
Conclusion	Populism	 using	 religious	 and	ethnic	 identity	 plus	 the	 issue	 of	 poverty	managed	 to	divide	 the	 citizens	of	 Jakarta	during	 Jakarta	 2017	 Gubernatorial	election.	 Society	 split	 in	 two.	 First,	 the	supporter	 and	 voters	 of	 the	 Muslim	Governor.	The	idea	of	Muslim	governor	is	rooted	 in	 the	 rejection	 of	 some	 Islamic	organizations	 against	 the	 rise	 of	 Ahok	replacing	 Jokowi	 who	 was	 elected	President.	 They	 succeed	 to	 manage	 the	sentiment	 that	 Jakarta	 inhabited	 by	
Muslim	 communities	 should	 be	 led	 by	Muslim	 leaders.	 The	 momentum	 is	 the	blasphemy	 by	 Ahok's	 that	 emerging	various	 movements:	 demonstration	involves	 large	 masses,	 intimidation	 of	Ahok's	 supporters,	 and	 the	 use	 of	mosques	 as	 a	 mouthpiece	 to	 reject	 non-moslem	leaders.		Second,	 Ahok	 supporter.	 The	 case	of	 blasphemy	 makes	 Ahok's	 supporters	called	 supporters	 of	 blasphemy,	 and	 if	Muslims	 are	 considered	 hypocritical.	Ahok's	 voters,	 especially	 from	 the	Muslims,	 have	 difficulty	 expressing	 their	expressions,	 because	 of	 their	concentration	 on	 social	 life,	 for	 example,	they	 refused	 to	 be	worshiped	when	 they	died.The	 movement	 encourages	 the	emergence	of	Muslim	leaders	to	meet	the	interests	 of	 candidates	 who	 use	 this	strategy.	 Anies	 Baswedan	 became	 a	successful	 leader	 utilizing	 this	 sentiment	and	 using	 the	 mosque	 to	 echo	 the	resistance	against	non-moslem	leaders.		The	pinnacle	of	victory	in	the	form	of	 a	 speech	 confirms	 that	his	 victory	 is	 a	victory	of	the	pribumi-Muslim	against	the	Occupation,	not	 	 the	victory	of	 the	whole	Jakarta	citizen.	Anies	populism	 is	not	 the	end.	 When	 expressed	 in	 an	 	 explicit	victory	 speech,	 he	 is	 the	 beginning	 of	 a	further	 escalation	 in	 politics	 at	 the	national	 	 level.	 In	 this	 context,	 the	populism	 	 poses	 a	 threat	 to	 democracy,	since	 the	 use	 of	 a	 majority	 identity	(Muslim-native)	 will	 threaten	 minorities	and	 promote	 division	 in	 the	 Indonesian	life	order	and	society	that	unity	has	been	formed	 and	 hurt	 	 democracy	 system	 in	Indonesia.	
I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	
Journal	of	Governance	Volume	4,	Issue	1,	June		2019	
	 	 						 14	
References	Canovan,	M.	(1999)	Trust	the	people!	Populism	and	the	two	Faces	of	Democracy,	Political	Studies	(1999),	XLVII,	p.2-16	Creswell,	 John	 W.	 (1998)	 Qualitative	
Inquiry	 and	 Research	 Design,	
Choosing	 Among	 Five	 Traditions.	
California:	Sage	Publication.	
Detik.com	(2017)	Spanduk	Tolak	Salatkan	
Jenazah	Terpasang	di	3	Mesjid	Karet	
Jaksel.	 Online:	
https://news.detik.com/berita/3431
781/spanduk-tolak-salatkan-
jenazah-terpasang-di-3-masjid-di-
karet-jaksel	Engesser,	 S.,	 Ernst,	 N.,	 Esser,F.,	 and	Buchel,	 F	 (2015)	 Populism	 and	Social	 Media,	 How	 Politicians	Spread	 A	 Fragmented	 Information,	Communication	and	Society,	Vol.	20,	No.8,	 1109-1126.	http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/136	9118X.2016.1207697	Fuest,	 C.	 2017:	 The	 Year	 of	 European	Populism?	 Intereconomics	 (2017)	52:	 2.	https://doi.org/10.1007/s102	 72-017-0634-2	Gerbaudo,	 P.	 (2018).	 Social	 media	 and	populism:	 an	 elective	 affinity?	
Media,	 Culture	&	Society,	 40(5),745-745.	 https://doi.org/10.1177/0	163443718772192	Hamid,	 A.	 (2014).	 Jokowi’s	 Populism	 in	the	 2012	 Jakarta	 Gubernatorial	Election.	 Journal	 Of	 Current	
Southeast	 Asian	 Affairs,	 33(1),	 85-109.	 Retrieved	 September	 8,	 2016,	From	 http://journals.sub.uni-	Hamburg.de./giga/jsaa/article/view/738	Hawkins,	 	 K.,	 	 and	 	 Selway,	 	 J.	 	 	 (2017)	Thaksin	 The	 Populist?	 Chin	 Polit.	Sci.	 Rev.	 (2017)	 2:372-394	 DOI	10.1007/s41111-017-00732-z	Indikator	 Politik	 Indonesia	 (2017)	 Exit	Poll	 Pilgub	 DKI	 Jakarta	 Putaran																		Ke-2,	 19	 April	 2017.	 Online:	
https://indikator.co.id/uploads/20170421215057.Exit_Poll_DKI_2017_Putaran2_logo_pdf	Iskandar,	RA	 (2017)	Panwaslu	Kaji	 Surat	Pilih	Gubernur	Muslim	Agar	Jenazah	Dishalatkan,	 liputan6.com,	 Online:		http://pilkada.liputan6.com/read/2886871/panwaslu-kaji-surat-pilih-gubernur-muslim-agar-jenazah-disalatkan	Jaringan	 Rakyat	Miskin	 Kota	 Jakarta	 and	Urban	 Poor	 Consortium	 (2017)		JRMK-UPC	Kontrak	Politik	(Lagi).	KPU	 DKI	 Jakarta	 (2017)	 Data	 dan		
Infografik	Pilkada	DKI	Jakarta,	2017.	Jakarta:	KPU	DKI	Jakarta.	Laclau,	E	(2005)	On	Populist	Reason,	New	York,	London:	Verso.		Linz,	 J	and	Stepan,	A	 	 (1996)	Problems	of	
democratic	 transition	 and	
consolidation.	 Baltimore:	 Johns	Hopkins	University	Press.	Marzouki,	 N.,	 McDonell,	 D.	 (2016)	
Populism	 and	 Religion,	 in	Marzouki,	mcDonell,	and	Roy,	Save	The	People,	How	 Populist	 Hijack	 religion,	 New	York:	Oxford	University	Press.	Merdeka.com,	 2017.	 Saat	 Wartawan	Metro	 TV	 Jadi	 Sasaran	 Massa	 di	Berbagai	 Aksi	 Bela	 Islam,	 Online:	https://www.merdeka.com/peristiwa/saat-wartawan-metrotv-jadi-sasaran-massa-di-berbagai-aksi-bela-islam.html	Miichi,	 Ken	 (2014),	 The	 Role	 of	 Religion	And	 Ethnicity	 in	 Jakarta’s	 2012	Gubernatorial	Election,	in:	Journal	of	Current	 Southeast	 Asian	
Affairs,33,1,55-83.	 Retrieved	September	 8,2016,	 From	https://journals.sub.uni-Hamburg.de/giga/jsaa/article/view/737/735	Mizuno,	 K	 and	 Phongpaichit,	 P	 (2009)	Introduction,	 in	 Mizuno,	 K	 and	Phongpaichit,	 P(Ed),	 (2009)	Populism	 in	 Asia	 Singapore:	 NUS	Press,	Kyoto:	Kyoto	University	Press	
I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	
Hamid,	Populism	in	the	2017	Jakarta	Gubernatorial	Election		
	 	 	 	15	
Mudde,	C.	(2017)	Populism:	An	Ideational								
Approach.	 In	 Kaltwasser,	 CR,	Taggart,	P,	Espejo,	P.O,	and	Ostiguy,	P.	 (2017)	 The	 Oxford	 Handbook	 of	Populism.	 	 Oxford:	 Oxford	University	Press.		Okotomo,	 M	 and	 Honna,	 J	 (2014)	Introduction:	 “Local”	 Politics	 in	Jakarta:	 Anomaly	 from	 Indonesia’s	Local	 Politics?	 Journal	 of	 Current	
Southeast	Asian	Affairs,33,	1,3-6,	Panizza	(2005)	Populism	and	the	Mirror	of	
Democracy,	New	York:	Verso	Pamungkas,	 AS	 and	 Octaviani,	 G	 (2017)	
Aksi	 Bela	 Islam	 dan	 Ruang	 Publik	
Muslim:	Dari	Representasi	Daring	ke	
Komunitas	 Luring,	 Jurnal	 Pemikiran	
Sosiologi,	Vol.	4	No.	2,	Agustus	2017,	p.65-87	Republika.com	 (2015).	 Demo	 Ahok,	 GMJ	Selamatkan	 Jakarta	 dari	 Pemimpin	Kafir.	 Online:	http://www.republika.co.id/berita/nasional/jabodetabek-nasional/15/06/01/np9039-demo-ahok-gmj-selamatkan-jakarta-dari-pemimpin-kafir	Salgado,	 (2019)	 S.	 Where’s	 populism?										Online	 media	 and	 the	 diffusion	 of	populist	 discourses	 and	 styles	 in	Portugal	 .	 Eur	 Polit	 Sci.	 18:53–65	https://doi.org/10.1057/s41304-017-0137-4		Spruyt,	 B.,	 Keppens,	 G.,	 &	 Van	Droogenbroeck,	 F.	 (2016).	 Who	
Supports	 Populism	 and	 What	Attracts	 People	 to	 It?	Political	
Research	 Quarterly,	69(2),	 335–346.	https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912916639138	Syaukani,	 AR(2017)	 Penjelasan	Mengapa	Jenazah	 Nenek	 Pendukung	 Ahok-Djarot	 ini	 tidak	 Dihsalatkan	 di	Mushola.	 Tabloid	 Bintang.	 Online:	https://www.tabloidbintang.com/berita/peristiwa/read/62549/penjelasan-mengapa-jenazah-nenek-pendukung-ahokdjarot-ini-tidak-dishalatkan-di-musala	SP,	 Johan	 (2017)	 Eep	 Saefulloh	 Fatah	Umat	 Islam	 dan	 Kontestasi	 Politik	Jakarta,	 Online:	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=csZJSVeg5FQ	Tempo.co,	 10	 November	 2016.	 Di	Tempat-tempat	 Ini	 Ahok	Dihadang,	 Kampanye	 pun	Batal	 	Online:	https://metro.tempo.co/read/819332/di-tempat-tempat-ini-ahok-dihadang-kampanye-pun-batal	VOA	 Islam,	 2017,	 Muzakarah	 Ulama	Putuskan	 Dukung	 Kedua	 Pasang	Calon	 Muslim,	 Online:	http://www.voa-islam.com/read/indonesiana/2016/09/30/46466/muzakarah-ulama-putuskan-dukung-kedua-pasang-calon-gubernur-muslim/#sthash.EE7Yomki.dpbs	
	
